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Abstract:  In  this  paper  it  is  argued  that  we  should  amend  the  traditional 
understanding of the view known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good 
is traditionally understood as the view that we only want to act in ways that we 
believe to be good in some way. But it is argued that a more plausible view is 
that we only want to act in ways that we believe we have normative reason to act 
in. This change – from formulating the view in terms of goodness to formulating 
it in terms of reasons – is significant because the revised view avoids various old 
and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised view is 
better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better 
placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view. The paper 
finishes by showing that the conclusions reached are compatible with theories 
such as the buck passing account of value. 
 
In this paper it is argued that we should amend the traditional understanding of the view 
known as the guise of the good. The guise of the good is traditionally understood as the 
view that we only want to act in ways that we believe to be good in some way. It will be 
argued that a more plausible view is that we only want to act in ways that we believe we 
have normative reason to act in. This change – from formulating the view in terms of Alex Gregory  2 
goodness to formulating it in terms of reasons – is significant because the revised view 
avoids various old and new counterexamples to the traditional view, because the revised 
view is better motivated than the traditional view, and because the revised view is better 
placed to explain certain features of desire than the traditional view. 
 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  1  describes  the  two  candidate  views  in 
greater detail. Section 2 argues for the guise of reasons over the guise of the good by 
appeal to five examples. Section 3 provides two more theoretical arguments for the 
guise  of  reasons.  Finally,  in  section  4,  it  is  shown  that  the  conclusions  drawn  are 
compatible with views that draw some kind of equivalence between facts about reasons 
and facts about values, such as the buck passing account of value. 
 
(1) The Views 
The broad view we are examining says something along the following lines: 
The Guise of the Normative: Some aspects of agency are constrained by our beliefs 
about normativity.
i 
 
But  the  differences  between  different  form ulations  of  this  view  may  affect  its 
plausibility. Here we shall adjudicate between the following two more determinate 
possibilities: 
The Guise of the Good: We only desire to act in ways that we believe to be good in 
some way. 
The Guise of Reasons: We only desire to act in ways that we believe we have normative 
reason to act in. 
 Alex Gregory  3 
Anscombe (1963: 75), Aquinas (ST I-II.1.1, DV 24.2), and Davidson (2001: 22-3) all 
characterise the guise of the normative as the guise of the good. Raz endorses both the 
guise of the good and the guise of reasons (1999: 22-3, 2010: 111). Setiya (2007: 16) 
comes close to characterising the guise of the normative as the guise of reasons, though 
he  understands  it  as  a  view  about  intentional  actions  rather  than  as  a  view  about 
desires.
ii Velleman argues against the guise of the good, but does seem to suggest that 
he nonetheless endorses something like the guise of reasons (1992: 20 -21). So both of 
the above views are tacitly present in the literature, but the distinction between them has 
not received much attention, presumably in large part because it may seem unlikely that 
the distinction between them matters. We shall see that this is not true. 
 
Before we get to that, we should briefly note how these views are similar. They are 
similar in that they both treat the guise of the normative as a constraint on desire. We 
shall assume that desires are just any state with motivating potential, and accordingly 
“desire” and “want” will be used interchangeably in this paper. For this same reason, we 
shall  think  of  desires  as  always  being  desires  to  act.  This  idea  has  some  intuitive 
plausibility, and is anyway entailed by the standard way of characterising the direction 
of fit of desire in terms of motivational dispositions (see, for example, Smith 1994, 
chapter 4).  
 
It is true that some treat the guise of the normative as a constraint on intentions or 
actions rather than on desires (e.g. Raz 1999: 23, 2010: 111, Setiya 2007: 16, Sussman 
2009: 614). But it is more plausible to treat the guise of the normative as a constraint on 
desire. To the extent that our intentions or actions are constrained by our beliefs about 
the normative, it seems that this is because they are explained by prior desires which are Alex Gregory  4 
themselves so constrained (cf. Davidson 1999: 23-3, Velleman 1992: 3). Otherwise we 
might end up with the strange view that our desires are not constrained by our beliefs 
about the normative but our intentions or actions are. On this view, we have some 
desires which are constitutionally incapable of moving us to act, which is implausible. 
So these views are right to treat the guise of the normative as a view about desire. 
 
In summary, the guise of the good and the guise of reasons are alike in that they treat 
the guise of the normative as a constraint on desire, and this is for the best. But the 
focus of this paper is on how these views are different. The guise of the good says that 
our desires are constrained by our beliefs about what is good. It is safest to interpret this 
view as saying that we can only desire to act in ways that we believe are good in any 
way – predicatively, attributively, instrumentally, finally, or however else. Perhaps that 
is too permissive, but since we will reject the view for independent reasons – indeed, 
partly  for  being  too  restrictive  –  we  need  not  worry  about  what  the  appropriately 
restricted view ought to say. 
 
In contrast, the guise of reasons says that our desires are constrained by our beliefs 
about what we have normative reason to do. A normative reason is a fact that counts in 
favour of some course of action. Again, we will take this view to say that we can only 
desire to act in ways that we believe we have any normative reason to act in – whether 
the reason is instrumental, final, moral, non-moral, strong, weak, or whatever else. 
 
In short, the guise of the good and the guise of reasons both state constraints on desire, 
but one claims that our desires are constrained by our beliefs about the good, whereas 
the other claims that our desires are constrained by our beliefs about reasons. We shall Alex Gregory  5 
now examine five counterexamples to the guise of the good, and see why they are not 
counterexamples to the guise of reasons. 
 
(2) Counterexamples 
The first two counterexamples to the guise of the good we shall address together: 
(i) “Suppose that I promise my children that I will tie my right shoelaces before 
my left shoelaces on alternate days of the week if they will do their homework 
without  fuss.  One  can  imagine  arguing  that  though  I  ought  to  tie  my  right 
shoelaces before my left shoelaces today, since I did the opposite yesterday, my 
doing so has no value of any form.” 
(Dancy 2000: 168) 
  
(ii)  “The  management  proposes  to  close  the  colliery.  The  miners  vote  on 
whether to accept the proposal and the redundancy pay that goes with it or to 
oppose it. You talk to one of the miners: ‘You are voting to stay put.’ ‘Sure,’ he 
says. ‘So you must have some hope [of keeping the mine open].’ ‘No hope. Just 
principles.’” 
(Raz 2010: 112-113) 
 
It seems that Dancy might desire to tie his shoelaces in a way that he does not believe 
good, and that Raz’s miner might desire to vote in a way that he does not believe good. 
These are not the standard sorts of counterexample to the guise of the good, to be sure. 
It is tempting to think that counterexamples to the guise of the good, like those we 
examine below, will appeal to either the bad or the bland. But these two examples show 
that this is false. In these examples, we have agents who are committed to doing the Alex Gregory  6 
right thing. The problem for the guise of the good is that these agents believe that the 
right  thing  to  do  is  not  a  good  thing  to  do.  This  is  a  familiar  feature  of  various 
deontological views. According to the guise of the good, anyone committed to such a 
view could not always desire to do their duty. But this looks hopelessly implausible. 
Regardless of whether such views are true, they are at least views which people can 
hold and be motivated by. 
 
Such cases are clearly no counterexample to the guise of reasons. It is very plausible 
that one can only desire to do what one thinks is right if one also thinks that one has 
reason to do what is right. So the guise of reasons has the resources to explain why one 
can desire to do one’s duty, even if one thinks that doing one’s duty is in no way good. 
 
The second counterexample to the guise of the good will be more familiar: 
(iii) “Consider the figure of Satan in Paradise Lost, who responds to his defeat 
with the cry, ‘Evil be thou my Good.’ Satan is here resolving to desire and 
pursue evil, and hence-as he himself puts it-to regard evil as good. But he cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as adopting new estimates of what's valuable-that is, as 
resolving to cease judging evil to be evil and to start judging it to be good. If 
Satan ever loses sight of the evil in what he now desires, if he ever comes to 
think of what he desires as really good, he will no longer be at all satanic; he'll 
be just another well-intentioned fool. The ruler of Hell doesn't desire what he 
wrongly thinks is worthy of approval; he desires what he rightly thinks isn't.”  
(Velleman 1992:18) 
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Satan  desires  to  do  things  that  he  believes  are  bad.  There  are  two  responses  that 
defenders of the guise of the good might offer in the face of this counterexample to their 
view. 
 
First, they might claim that things can be good in a number of different ways, and so 
claim that even if Satan sees no moral good in what he desires to do, he must still see 
some other good in it (Alvarez 2009: 218-9, Anscombe 1963: 75). Perhaps he sees 
value in demonstrating his liberty, in being a rebel, or something similar. We will call 
this kind of move The Expansion Strategy. The expansion strategy defends the guise of 
the good by expanding our conception of the kinds of good that people might see in 
what they desire. 
 
It  is  far  from  clear  that  the  expansion  strategy  can  render  the  guise  of  the  good 
compatible with a plausible interpretation of Satan’s beliefs and desires. We are being 
offered a view according to  which Satan wants to  act  in  ways  that he believes  are 
morally bad but good in some other way. So the overall picture being presented here is 
that Satan is in the very common position of believing that certain values conflict – 
being moral, and being free – and believes that the latter kind of value outweighs the 
former. But this seems to understate the divergence between us good folk and Satan. 
After  all,  we  might  agree  that  liberty  is  good,  and  that  there  can  sometimes  be 
something worthwhile in rebellion, and so on. Is the only remaining difference between 
us and him the respective weights we assign to these kinds of goodness? This seems 
implausible. 
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A second way to try and render this example compatible with the guise of the good is to 
say that whilst Satan does indeed desire what he judges to be bad, we can make sense of 
him only because he so perfectly inverts the guise of the good (Raz 1999: 32-34, 2010, 
Sussman  2009).  Satan’s  desires  are  not  random,  but  instead  guided  perfectly,  if 
perversely, by his beliefs about value. So we might claim that the example of Satan 
really supports, rather than undermines, the underlying thought behind the guise of the 
good.  For  Satan’s  desires  are  indeed  guided  by  his  value  judgements,  even  if  in  a 
perverse manner. In short, one might claim that the example of Satan does require that 
we qualify the guise of the good in a certain  way, but leaves the core of the view 
untouched.  We  will  call  this  kind  of  move  The  Inversion  Strategy.  The  inversion 
strategy defends by the guise of the good by qualifying it to allow for value inversion. 
 
But though the inversion strategy allows us to maintain some of the core features of the 
guise of the good, it forces us to dispense with others. Part of the appeal of the guise of 
the good is that it allows us to draw a parallel between belief and desire. It allows us to 
say that just as beliefs aim at the truth, desires aim at the good (see, e.g. Velleman 1992). 
But  we  cannot  maintain  this  parallel  if  we  pursue  the  inversion  strategy.  For  the 
inversion strategy says that we can perversely desire something just because it is bad. 
But it is very clear that one cannot perversely believe something just because it is false. 
So the inversion strategy undermines one key motivation for endorsing the guise of the 
good. 
 
The defender of the inversion strategy might try to insist that this parallel was bound to 
fail anyway. But this seems unlikely. One reason why it is appealing to hold that beliefs 
aim at the truth is that we seem powerless to alter them for any other reason (Shah Alex Gregory  9 
2003). Regardless of how much money anyone offers you to believe that grass is blue, 
you can’t believe it.
iii If this is a good motivation for thinking that beliefs aim at the 
truth, it seems that there is a parallel motivation for thinking that desires aim at the 
normative. For again, no matter how much money someone offers you to want to eat a 
saucer of mud, you can’t form the desire.
iv Just as you’ll only come to believe that grass 
is blue if that claim seems true, so too will you only want to eat a saucer of mud if you 
think that there’s at least something going for that course of action. 
 
In short, the guise of the normative is best understood as stating a constraint on desire 
that  parallels  a  constraint  on  belief.  And  for  this  reason,  the  inversion  strategy  is 
unappealing. It follows that we cannot render the guise of the good consistent with the 
example of Satan in a satisfactory manner. 
 
But the guise of reasons can accommodate Satan much more easily. It seems plausible 
that Satan desires to act in ways that he believes he has reason to act in. For it is true – 
and this is what the expansion strategy has correct – that he has a rationale for his 
desires, and to this extent it is true that he believes that there is some reason to act as he 
desires to act. But we can say this and agree that he is pursuing badness. Not that he is 
merely prioritising one kind of goodness over another, but that he is prioritising the bad, 
in general, over the good, in general. And in saying this we also capture what was 
appealing about the inversion strategy. Satan believes he has reason to promote the bad. 
That is the sense in which his approach to value is inverted. 
 
We now turn to a fourth counterexample to the guise of the good: Alex Gregory  10 
(iv) Jeff has had an upsetting argument with his partner, and afterwards in a 
mood of guilt and frustration, he strongly desires to destroy the difficult project 
that he has spent much of his recent life working on. 
 
After his upsetting argument, Jeff seems to desire something that he thinks just makes 
things worse. Stocker appeals to a similar thought when he writes that: 
“Just  as  there are desires  and appetites directed at  harming others,  there  are 
desires and appetites directed at harming oneself. In certain moods, such as the 
self-directed modes of disgust, hatred, guilt, shame, I may seek to humble, abase, 
or harm myself.” 
(Stocker 1979: 748, see also Velleman 1992: 17-18) 
 
It seems that we sometimes desire things that we judge to be bad for ourselves and good 
for  nothing.  Clearly,  this  would  be  a  problem  for  the  guise  of  the  good.  Again, 
defenders of the view might try to accommodate the example by pursuing the expansion 
strategy or the inversion strategy. 
 
But the expansion strategy seems even less plausible here than it did above. It seems 
forced to insist that Jeff must see something good about destroying this project of his. 
Even if we broaden our conception of what it is to judge something good, it’s just not 
clear what value we could even name that he might be pursuing. If he thinks that this act 
is bad for him, and has no real effect on others, why on earth would he still think it 
good?
v 
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The inversion strategy is here neither more nor less plausible than it is in the case of 
Satan. It is true that Jeff appears to be guided by his judgements about value, though in 
a perfectly inverted way. But again, we might worry that allowing this undermines the 
appealing parallel between belief and desire that we hoped the guise of the normative 
would support. 
 
It is again far from clear that this example can be rendered consistent with the guise of 
the good. But the guise of reasons is not impugned by the example. It is plausible to 
suppose that if Jeff genuinely desires to destroy his project, that must be because he 
believes that he has a reason to do so: because he thinks this is the appropriate action in 
these circumstances (or at least, this is what he thinks whilst he has the desire). In 
desiring this he believes that he has reason to make things worse. 
 
It is worth comparing this case with the first two. One natural way of understanding 
Jeff’s desire to harm himself is to think of him as believing that it is somehow fitting, 
even if bad, that his project should be destroyed. In that respect, Jeff’s attitude is just 
like the deontologist who believes that some action is right but bad. 
 
In this respect, Jeff’s attitude also seems like the attitude of Watson’s squash player who 
wants to hit their victorious opponent with the racquet (Watson 1982: 100-101). Watson 
persuasively suggests that they might want to do this without thinking that it would be 
good for their opponent to suffer. But again, it is tempting to think that the squash 
player believes (however briefly) that their opponent deserves to be hit in the face, and a 
natural interpretation of this is that they believe that they have reason to harm their Alex Gregory  12 
opponent. Here too, it seems that this is a counterexample to the guise of the good but 
not the guise of reasons. 
 
Let us move on to consider a final counterexample to the guise of the good: 
(v) “Sitting in the bath, Johnny, and it does not matter whether he is a child or an 
adult acting like a child, says, ‘I am a fish’ and beats the water with his open 
palm (presumably pretending to flap it with his tail). ‘Why did  you do that, 
Johnny?’ ‘That’s what fish do.’” 
(Raz 2010: 113) 
 
Johnny desires to act in a way that he thinks is in no way good. More generally, there 
seem to be playful, whimsical or just plain silly desires. Velleman has the same worry 
for  the  guise  of  the  good  when  he  writes:  “a  mood  of  playfulness  is,  in  part,  a 
disposition to form desires for things conceived as having no particular value” (1992: 
17). 
  
We might again try to respond to the example by employing the expansion strategy, and 
claim  that  Johnny  sees  something  good  about  being  playful,  silly,  spontaneous,  or 
similar (Raz 2010: 115, see also Raz 1999: 30). But we don’t independently think that 
people assign value to these things, and asserting that they do simply to salvage the 
guise of the good is ad hoc and threatens to trivialise the view. If we are happy to 
ascribe value judgements to people solely on the basis of what they desire, then the 
guise of the good loses its explanatory force. For in this trivialised form, we are unable 
to  make  sound  judgements  about  what  people  believe  to  be  good  without  first 
examining their desires. On this trivialised version of the view, the sense in which our Alex Gregory  13 
value judgements constrain our desires is like the sense in which a slave constrains his 
master: only the things the slave does are those the master ordered. If this is the right 
way to hold the guise of the good, it is not as interesting as it first seemed. 
 
The inversion strategy is here even more hopeless than the expansion strategy. Johnny 
doesn’t act in light of his value judgements at all: he aims for something he thinks of as 
neither good nor bad. Might we say that he is guided by the neutral? This seems ad hoc, 
and to whatever extent the value inversion strategy threatened to undermine the appeal 
of the view, this new strategy is even worse. 
 
But yet again, though Johnny poses a problem for the guise of the good, it is far less 
clear that he poses a problem for the guise of reasons. For we might well think that 
Johnny does think that he has some reason to play as a fish. No doubt we must be 
careful not to think of the reason involved as particularly strong. Indeed, if you asked 
Johnny why he wants to play as a fish, he might even say that he’s doing it “for no real 
reason at all”. But we need not take this assertion at face value. One implication of 
Grice’s  maxim  of  quantity  is  that  asserting  that  one  has  a  reason  to  do  something 
conversationally implies that the reason is at least somewhat important. Conversely, it 
follows that if one believes that one has only an extremely weak reason to do something, 
it would be misleading to assert that one has that reason (Schroeder 2007a: 92-6). So 
perhaps it is true but conversationally inappropriate for Johnny to say that he has a 
reason to play as a fish.
vi 
 
This point is relevant when assessing some other supposed counterexamples to the guise 
of the normative, examples which may be thought to also undermine the guise of Alex Gregory  14 
reasons. Here I have in mind Watson’s case of the mother who wants to drown her 
bawling baby in the bath (1982: 100-101), and Setiya’s example of the person who flees 
from their burning house leaving their family behind (2010: 90).
vii In both of these cases 
it is clear that the agent will not confess to believing that they have any reason to 
perform the action that they want to perform. But all the same, it seems plausib le to 
think that they do believe this. For clearly, drowning the baby would stop the annoying 
crying, and fleeing the house may save one’s life. It would sound strange for these 
agents to say that they believe they have these reasons only because these reasons are 
insignificant compared to the reasons they have to act differently (cf. Schroeder 2007a: 
95-6, where he persuasively suggests that it is true but inappropriate to assert that you 
have a reason to eat your car). 
 
In this section, we have examined five main counterexamples to the guise of the good. 
We saw that they succeeded in this task, but that they failed to undermine the guise of 
reasons. There might yet be other examples which do undermine the guise of reasons. 
We cannot  rule this out in advance, and to this extent, the defence of the guise of 
reasons here is inconclusive. Still, many of the best known counterexamples to the view 
seem to fail, and this provides some grounds for optimism. In the next section, we 
examine two further arguments for the guise of reasons over the guise of the good. 
 
(3) Reasons and Goodness 
The guise of the good and the guise of reasons differ because one employs the concept 
of goodness, whereas the other employs the concept of a reason. The contrast between 
the concept of goodness and the concept of a reason is a contrast between an evaluative 
concept and a deontic one. Of course, reasons are not deontic in the sense that they Alex Gregory  15 
demand that certain things be done, but they do at least suggest that certain things be 
done,  and on plausible  assumptions,  they are interdefined  with  the paradigmatically 
deontic concepts like ought (e.g. Broome 2004). 
 
Given that the concept of a reason is a deontic concept, it is clear that one central thing 
we should have in mind when we think about reasons is that they pass judgement on our 
actions (cf. Dancy 2000a: 170-1).
viii If I believe that I have a reason, I must believe that 
I have that reason for something: for performing some particular action. It is in light of 
this fact that people have been tempted to make further claims about reasons: that they 
are tightly interconnected with motivating reasons (e.g. Dancy 2000b, Williams 1981: 
102, 106, 1995: 38-9), that one can only have a reason to do what one can do (e.g. 
Streumer  2007),  and  that  reasons  are  necessarily  agent-relative  (e.g.  Rønnow-
Rasmussen 2009: 230-231). 
 
Things are different for goodness. I might believe that something is good without yet 
thinking about actions at all. And even when we restrict our attention to the goodness of 
actions rather than goodness more generally, it is far from obvious that there is a close 
connection between the goodness of actions and motivating reasons, that there is a close 
connection between an action being good and being able to do it, or that the goodness of 
an action could be agent-relative, let alone that it must be (cf. Schroeder 2007b). 
 
All of these facts together point to the conclusion that reasons are action guiding in a 
way that goodness is not. This shows that the guise of reasons is better motivated than 
the guise of the good. It is more plausible to think that our desires are constrained by 
our beliefs about properties which are action guiding than by properties which are not. Alex Gregory  16 
  
This not only shows that the guise of reasons is better motivated than the guise of the 
good, but also shows that the guise of reasons can explain a feature of desire that the 
guise of the good cannot. Consider the distinction between desires and wishes. Though 
wishes  seem  to  have  something  in  common  with  desire,  they  are  nonetheless  two 
distinct kinds of mental state. For whereas we can wish to do just anything, we can only 
desire to do things that we believe we can possibly do. David Velleman has argued that 
the guise of the good fails to have the resources to make this distinction (1992: 12-17). 
For the guise of the good says that desires aim at what is good, and there is no reason to 
think that good things must be possible things. Perhaps defenders of the guise of the 
good can claim that their view only states one constraint on desire, and can allow that 
there are other constraints as well. But even if they can say this, it would clearly be an 
advantage for the guise of reasons if it can do more and show why there is this further 
constraint. 
 
It is highly plausible that you can only have a reason to do something if you are able to 
do  it  (again,  see  Streumer  2007).  Call  this  the  reason-implies-can  principle.  If  the 
reason-implies-can principle is true, we can see why desires might be distinguished 
from wishes. For if we can only desire to do what we believe we have reason to do, and 
– assuming that we accept the reason-implies-can principle – we can only believe that 
we have reason to do what we believe we can do, it is bound to follow that we can only 
desire to do what we believe we can do. So if the guise of reasons is true, we make the 
distinction  between  desires  and  wishes  for  just  the  same  reason  as  we  distinguish 
between what we have reason to do, and what we would have reason to do if we were 
able. Alex Gregory  17 
 
In summary, the guise of reasons is able to explain why we distinguish desires and 
wishes. And it is also more generally plausible to think that desires would aim at action 
guiding properties like reasons than less action guiding properties like goodness. These 
two advantages of the view, in combination with the examples in section (2), should 
convince us that if either of the guise of reasons or the guise of the good is true, it will 
be the guise of reasons. 
 
(4) Equivalence Theories 
With the arguments for the guise of reasons in place, there is an objection to consider. 
One might think that the difference between the guise of the good and the guise of 
reasons has been exaggerated. 
 
Some people believe that the value of an action determines the reasons we have to 
perform it (e.g. Raz 2010: 125-129). Other people believe the buck passing account of 
value and claim that the reasons we have to perform an action determine its value (e.g. 
Scanlon 1998: 95-100). Either way, there is an equivalence between facts about values 
and facts about reasons. Call any view with this implication an Equivalence Theory. If 
some equivalence theory were correct, we might think that the guise of the good and the 
guise of reasons must stand or fall together. One might think that if an agent believes 
that an action is good, then they must believe that they have reason to perform it, and 
vice versa.  
 
Of course, equivalence theories are controversial. If all equivalence theories are false, 
there is clearly no problem for the distinction between the guise of the good and the Alex Gregory  18 
guise of reasons. But it would be outside the scope of this paper to argue against all 
such theories, and so it would be better if there were something more concessive to say 
to those who want to maintain an equivalence theory. 
 
One point worth making is that an equivalence theory may be implausible if it states an 
exact equivalence between the value of actions and the reasons we have to perform 
them. This is so for various reasons, but most relevantly because it seems as though 
value is likely to correlate with agent-neutral reasons rather than agent-relative reasons 
(cf.  Schroeder  2007b).  So  it  seems  as  though  the  most  plausible  statement  of 
equivalence  theories  will  allow  that  we  can  have  agent-relative  reasons  to  perform 
actions  that are bad overall, such as  saving one’s  partner at  the  expense of several 
strangers. It follows that even if some equivalence theory is true, the guise of the good 
and  the  guise  of  reasons  may  have  different  implications  in  cases  where  the  agent 
believes that the reasons they have to act in various ways are agent-relative rather than 
agent-neutral. This seems highly likely for the examples above. For example, it seems 
entirely possible that Satan believes that the reasons he has to promote the bad are his 
and his alone. So perhaps those who hold equivalence theories have the resources to 
permit the distinction between the guise of the good and the guise of reasons, and the 
resources to agree with the arguments we have examined. 
  
But there is a more decisive reason to think that equivalence theories are no objection to 
the arguments in this paper. Equivalence theories are theories about the relationship 
between two properties: between the property of being good and the property of being a 
reason. But the guise of the good and the guise of reasons make no claims about such 
properties. They instead only make claims about our beliefs about such properties. So Alex Gregory  19 
all that defenders of equivalence theories need to say is that these theories only diverge 
in cases where agents have false beliefs. In so far as equivalence theories are plausible, 
this seems plausible. For example, defenders of equivalence theories seem highly likely 
to  believe  that  Dancy  has  false  beliefs  if  he  believes  that  he  ought  to  tie  his  right 
shoelaces before his left even though it is not good to do so.  
 
Raz fails to notice this point when addressing the dispute between the guise of reasons 
and the guise of the good. He writes that “the question under consideration is whether 
reasons for action are that the actions have some value. If they are then [if agents act for 
what they believe to be reasons, then] barring conceptual ignorance or mistakes, actions 
[…] are performed in the belief that the action has some value” (2010: 125, see also 
Setiya 2010: 85). But when discussing these views we certainly should not be excluding 
cases  of  conceptual  ignorance  or  mistakes.  Such  cases  are  perfectly  relevant  to 
evaluating  these  views,  since  they  each  make  claims  about  how  all  of  our  beliefs 
constrain our desires, not just about how our correct beliefs do so. 
 
There is one minor concession left to make make. If one held an equivalence theory as a 
theory about our concepts of goodness and reasons rather than the properties, and one 
also thought that it is impossible to hold beliefs which are conceptually confused (or at 
least, that doing so is impossible in this case), then one should indeed to think that the 
guise of the good and the guise of reasons are indistinct. So it is true that there is some 
limitation on just who can accept the arguments that have been offered in favour of the 
guise of reasons. But views of this kind are  very bold, since they involve not only 
asserting an  equivalence theory, but  also  asserting that no-one has ever  denied that Alex Gregory  20 
equivalence theory. Perhaps it is no great loss if a position this extreme is incompatible 
with the arguments that have been pressed. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper distinguished two formulations of the guise of the normative: the guise of the 
good, and the guise of reasons. It was argued that this distinction is significant because 
many of the counterexamples to the guise of the good are not counterexamples to the 
guise of reasons, and because the guise of the good is less theoretically attractive than 
the guise of reasons. Insofar as we should hold either the guise of the good or the guise 
of reasons, we should hold the guise of reasons. Alex Gregory  21 
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i Here  and  throughout,  “normative”  is  used  as  an  umbrella  term  covering  both  the  deontic  and  the 
evaluative, both reasons and goodness. 
ii Setiya’s recent work on the guise of the good (especially 2007, part 1) objects to the view on the 
grounds of various considerations in the theory of action. It would be outside the scope of this paper to 
address whether or not Setiya’s objection would still apply if the guise of the good is held as a view about 
desires rather than intentional actions.  
iii At least, not directly: you might be able to volunteer for brain surgery that has the required effect, or 
similar. Alex Gregory  23 
                                                                                                                                               
iv You might form the desire to desire to eat the mud, of course. And if someone offered you money to eat 
the mud, then you might be able to form the desire to eat it. But neither of these facts is relevant. 
v One might wonder why the expansion strategy is still less plausible for this example than for the 
example of Satan above. The answe r is that there is at least some plausibility to the idea that Satan is 
doing bad things to others for the sake of himself. But in the present case, it is clearly implausible to 
suppose that Jeff is doing bad things to himself for the sake of others. 
vi It is true that this point about pragmatics can equally be used to defend the guise of the good. So the 
example is less threatening to  both of these views than it may seem to be. But this is consistent with it 
also being true that the case is less threatening to the guise of reasons than it is to the guise of the good. 
vii Similar remarks apply to other examples Setiya has raised (2007: 36 -7). In fairness, Setiya himself 
acknowledges that these examples are not enough to undermine the guise of the good by themse lves 
(2007: 38, 2010: 83) 
viii If we do not think that forming an attitude is a kind of action, we should instead say that reasons pass 
judgements on actions and the formation of attitudes. This complication has little relevance for this paper, 
and is hereafter ignored. 